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Affective Bodies: Nonhuman and Human Agencies in 
Djuna Barnes’s Fiction 
_Abstract 
Djuna Barnes’s work is an intriguing example of the ways fiction makes its readers 
face the nonhuman as having potential for agency, and shows the entanglements be-
tween human and nonhuman. In the stories, objects tend to steal the attention from 
the main characters and become agents in their own right. At the same time, a lot of 
Barnes’s human characters remain “unreadable,” and thing-like or animal-like; as 
such, nonhuman themselves. 
This article asks why readers become engaged with such texts and how we make 
sense of them. Drawing on new materialist and posthumanist conceptions of distrib-
uted agency and affect, I explore the entangled human and nonhuman agencies that 
contribute to the action of the narratives and, arguably, to their affective appeal, the 
two being closely intertwined. To discuss the reading processes the texts invite, I 
employ embodied cognitive approaches to the process of reading fiction. Based on 
the analysis of Barnes’s novel Nightwood and her less researched short fiction, I 
propose that reading these texts is largely a process of affective, embodied sense-
making that pertains equally to human and nonhuman fictional agents, revealing 
their mutual dependence and their equal capacity to affect. 
1_Introduction 
Reading fiction makes us face all kinds of situations, characters and phenomena that 
we might consider strange and uncanny, yet enchanting and immersive. This way, it 
also puts us face to face with the nonhuman in its various forms. Some fictional en-
counters with the nonhuman may become accentuated and even disturbing, especially 
ones in which the nonhuman presents itself as profoundly entangled with what we 
consider as human, which entails elements such as agency based on individual sub-
jectivity, psychologically motivated actions, and capacity for interpretation and un-
derstanding. Such entanglements are in no way specific to thematically experiential, 
generic niches such as science fiction and fantasy, but can also be encountered in, 
say, modernist prose, as this essay will show. Why do we become engaged with char-
acters who take a human form but whose inner life and motivations for actions remain 
unfathomable and inexplicable, such as Melville’s famous Bartleby, or characters 
who are presented in the narration as bearing close resemblance to nonhuman things1 
or animals? On the other hand, how shall we read and interpret fiction where nonhu-
man, inanimate things seem to have a life of their own, and invite readerly immersion 
and affective engagement as much as human characters? 
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Djuna Barnes’s (1892–1982) work combines these two sets of problems. Many of 
the thematic and formal aspects of her work are of a modernist making, in touch with 
European and American avant-gardes of the first half of the 20th century. Her work 
also carries a great amount of looking backward, what could be called “antiquarian-
ism”:2 some of her characters and milieux seem to come from the stock of both natu-
ralism and decadent symbolism, some plotlines and characters’ relations evoke Victo-
rian sentimentalism, others classical tragedy, while her language and some experi-
ments with genre hark all the way back to Renaissance literature. Barnes’s characters 
are often typified to the extent that they resemble characterizations in a Renaissance 
framework of humoralist personality types, or the stock characters of commedia 
dell’arte.3 On the other hand, her work engages in modernist directions theorized as 
“the dehumanization of art” by José Ortega y Gasset, identifiable in a turn to abstrac-
tion especially in the pictorial arts, but also in the lines of development leading to the 
Nouveau Roman, for instance.4 
Barnes’s work is also modernist in that it usually does not offer omniscient, extra-
diegetic descriptions or analyses of the internal states of her characters in the manner 
of a typical realist novel, for instance. However, in many cases, the alleged inner 
emotions and motivations of her characters are not decipherable even through what 
we are told of their actions, or through mimetic presentation of their talk. One can try 
to read the characters by imaginatively assuming they have an interiority or a person-
hood composed of knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions,5 but this approach 
tends to fall short of being helpful. Barnes’s characters often have what H. Porter Ab-
bott has called “unreadable minds.”6 Abbott suggests that such characters are “natu-
ralized” or made more readable by classifying them as types, catalysts for understand-
ing other characters, or as having a symbolic function. However, this too remains an 
insufficient analysis. First of all, there is usually no other character with more psycho-
logical profundity in sight, for the unreadable characters to mirror. All in all, it seems 
that we are engaged with Barnes’s characters, however typified, as characters before 
and besides grasping for a symbolic or functional explanation for their existence. 
Readers of Barnes might end up in trouble when applying reading methods that 
call for a ‘theory of mind’ or an assumption of certain cognitive processes as the basis 
of attributing consciousness to a character. Furthermore, the same fate of puzzlement 
threatens readers equipped with a symptomatically oriented framework of interpreta-
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tion, looking for repressed motives behind actions and emotions. One might become 
inclined to judge Barnes’s characters as literary failures not conveying what they 
should. Then again, this would be an oversight: her work does indeed convey a lot of 
things, also in the realm of feelings. There are deeply tragic tones, as well as pleas-
ures and pleasantries, which affect the way the work can be read and engaged with. 
As Julie Taylor notes, “while Barnes might be highly skeptical about Freudian no-
tions of depth, she was […] still interested in describing the dynamics of emotion.”7 
Rather than through individual depth-psychology, the affective tones available for 
readers to grasp are produced jointly through characters and other elements. These 
include descriptions of spaces, objects, and landscapes that form fictional encounters: 
the ways bodies — in this case meaning both human, lived bodies and nonhuman, 
material entities — move one another. The material, nonhuman elements, in turn, 
stand out and seem to demand a part in the distribution of agency, not being explaina-
ble solely as background material used to produce an illusion of realism, or as sym-
bolic references to something other than themselves. This is why the emphasis of my 
analyses will be on descriptive passages, to best illustrate the appeal of things and 
thingly characters an sich, not as proxies to action, which we might explain with a 
more naturalizing or humanizing touch — although it will also become apparent that 
the distinction between description and action is far from clear-cut.8 Another reason 
for selecting just such passages for analysis is a rather simple one: the predominance 
of description especially in Barnes’s later fiction. This is especially noteworthy in the 
case of short fiction, where most of the concise space afforded by the story form is 
devoted to building something like a still-life, with little or no action and no moment 
of epiphany typical of a modernist short story. As we will see, however, Barnes’s 
arrangements of things are actually far from still. 
As a way to discuss agency and the entanglements between fictional humans and 
nonhumans, I draw on new materialist conceptions of agency as distributed and affec-
tive, happening in constellations of more than one agent. These views broaden the 
scope of thinking about agency, which enables me to discuss the distinctions and sim-
ilarities of human and nonhuman agency in Barnes’s fiction, thereby also offer some 
insight into how a modified understanding of the roles of the human and nonhuman 
elements in fiction can help us make sense of Barnes’s work and its appeal. In addi-
tion, I am referring to embodied, enactive approaches to the cognitive study of fiction, 
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which are especially helpful for discussing the readerly experiences as well as the 
narrative techniques of immersion and ways of inviting engagement with both human 
and nonhuman fictional agents. 
In the following, I will first briefly discuss the theoretical and conceptual starting 
points of the analyses, then provide examples from Barnes’s best known novel, 
Nightwood, as well as from some of her lesser known short fiction, to develop these 
ideas. To illustrate the mutual entanglement of human and nonhuman, I will first 
touch upon the topic of Barnes’s characters as animal-like. This, however, is an area 
already largely covered in research. My emphasis is on the discussion of the “unread-
able” characters in the context of materiality and thingliness. The focus of the latter 
part, on the other hand, will be on the immersive qualities and agency of material 
things, and their co-operation with the character-descriptions. While providing in-
sights into the challenging oeuvre of Barnes, the readings can also enlighten various 
traits common to modernist literature and beyond, and open up new paths for the ex-
ploration of agency in literary fiction in general. The essay also raises the following, 
broader issue: in what ways does our distinction between human and nonhuman as 
agents help or hinder our making sense of fiction — or the world we live in? 
2_Entangled Agencies 
Before discussing the actual theoretical background of this essay, some conceptual 
clarifications are in order. As has become apparent, I am using the conceptual pair of 
‘nonhuman’ and ‘human’, while realizing that there is a variety of ideological bur-
dens and difficulties hidden in such dualisms. This is an example of a dichotomy in 
which the two halves constitute one another. There would be no need for ‘nonhu-
man,’ had we not ‘human’ as a point of departure, and the way we conceive of ‘hu-
man’ is largely dependent on what is left outside its scope — the definition of which 
is also a political and ethical decision in a historical context. 
Yet there are a multitude of nonhuman elements in what first looks human, and 
what we call nonhuman might have a variety of characteristics verging on human, 
considered culturally or biologically. The task of drawing a line between human and 
nonhuman becomes especially difficult when dealing with an imaginary sphere such 
as literature, although it does not seem so to begin with. The study of literature is 
usually seen falling within the scope of humanities, researching a field of life which 
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considers, predominantly, human beings, and pondering what it is to be human. It is 
from this perspective that researchers also come up with critical concepts like the 
nonhuman, or whole new ways of thinking about our place in the world and our rela-
tionship to the other, such as different traits of posthumanism. The production, con-
sumption, discussion, and making sense of literature all involve human agents com-
municating stories and meanings with a little help from things in the material world, 
such as ink, paper, and electronic devices. Writers and readers probably conceive of 
themselves and their experience as human. However, literature is also a sphere where 
imaginative solutions and devices such as personification of nonhuman entities are 
available, and in frequent and efficient use. In the phenomenon of reading, the divi-
sion of agency between the human and the nonhuman is actually far from clear-cut. I 
am writing about human experience, and making assumptions about human readers 
and characters, but I hope the following will show how this very humanness is pro-
foundly entangled with the nonhuman. 
Firstly, I draw on Karen Barad’s seminal account of agential realism. In this view, 
which encompasses both epistemological and ontological, even ethical issues, there is 
no individual agency as we have learned to conceive of it in most of the history of 
philosophy and humanist thinking. Agency is what emerges in constellations, what 
she calls “phenomena,” involving more than one agent, out of which any number can 
also be nonhuman and even ones we might consider as inanimate — Barad herself 
emphasizes the importance of nonhumans in these constellations.9 Agents not only 
interact in phenomena, but are constituted in and through them. On these grounds, 
Barad comes up with the term ‘intra-action’: 
[D]istinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. 
It is important to note that the “distinct” agencies are only distinct in a relational, 
not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mu-
tual entanglement; they don’t exist as individual elements.10 
The entangled phenomena of agential realism are mixtures of what we habitually call 
material and cultural — actually, in them, the distinction often ceases to matter, as we 
notice how players from both spheres alike emerge as agents in phenomena. 
In the context of literature, for example, we might use the idea of intra-action to 
shed light on how the agents involved in the phenomenon of reading literary fiction 
mutually constitute one another. The reader is human agents, but they are made such 
only in connection with the nonhuman agency of the text, while the writer emerges as 
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an imaginary agent. All three are culturally constructed entities, but they all also have 
a material dimension, even the imagined writerly agency. 11 Furthermore, besides the 
triangular arrangement, there are a multitude of other agencies involved. There are 
paper, pens, screens, keyboards and printing machines, there are chairs and tables; 
there are printed words and vocal sounds; there are intertextual references, prior hu-
man experiences and biological processes. Similarly, within the storyworld, we can 
observe fictional phenomena, consisting of a multitude of agencies, to be imagined 
and enacted by the readers entangled in the event of reading. 
Barad’s account is influenced, for instance, by the Actor Network Theory initiated 
by Bruno Latour, but the radically performative elements in her theory distinguish it 
from earlier formulations of distributed or material agency.12 Besides this context and 
the influential queer performativity as discussed by Judith Butler, this view of agency 
arises from the empirical findings at the core of quantum physics, which may have a 
share in making her thinking seem like quite a leap in the context of the humanities, 
in its attempt to erase the special position of the human not only as an agent, but also 
as the subject of observation, understanding and interpretation.13 Some of her conclu-
sions might be only partially applicable to a sphere such as literature, and more so for 
scientific practices and phenomena such as interaction between nano-sized particles 
only accessible to human observers with the help of specific instruments. However, 
agential realism also shares the profoundly humanist concern of what constitutes the 
human, and therefore is not separate from the long lineage of humanistic thinking — 
in fact, it is inescapably linked to it even by the term ‘posthumanism.’14 Barad speci-
fies that her use of this label “marks a refusal to take the distinction between ‘human’ 
and ‘nonhuman’ for granted,” and a will to investigate the very practices in which 
these poles are constituted.15 Such a shift in attention away from the predominance of 
the human subject is part of a larger, ethical concern, connected to the anthropocen-
trism of Western thinking and its implications for the abuse of nonhuman nature, for 
instance. In the context of Barnes’s fiction, these questions form a philosophical 
background, against which more practical questions of reading and literary sense-
making are set. 
The dynamics of Barad’s account bear resemblance to several theories of affect, 
although the concept is not overtly present in her work. ‘Affect’ is a multifaceted 
term, its definitions partly but not completely overlapping with those of ‘emotion.’ 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12351/ 
8 
Here I refer to the Spinozist-Deleuzean account, in which affect has come to mean the 
capacity of bodies to move and be moved — this being no unique property of human 
bodies.16 Another feature that distinguishes affect in this sense is its relationality, as 
opposed to the individuality more often associated with emotions: affects occur in-
between bodies, emotions can be shared but are usually seen as arising from reactions 
and appraisals that occur within the human subject, which is why using the term ‘af-
fect’ enables inclusion also of nonhuman and thingly agents in the discussion.17 
Thirdly, ‘affect’ is fit to be used to denote a rather vague, non-conceptualized color-
ing or mood, the phenomenon of moving and being moved in general. ‘Affect’ is the 
concept from the realm of ‘feeling’ that best suits the following discussion, because 
embodiedness and materiality, relationality and blurred lines seem to characterize the 
phenomena I wish to discuss in relation to Barnes’s writing.18  
Jane Bennett’s discussion of distributed agency is linked to this account of affect, 
while it also draws on Epicurean, Nietzschean, and vitalist traditions, as well as Actor 
Network Theory. Her notion of ‘vital materiality’ suggests, a bit more cautiously than 
Barad, that material things can “act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, forces 
or tendencies of their own.”19 These agents do not act alone, either. She conceives of 
agency, following Deleuze and Guattari, in assemblages, “confederation[s] of human 
and nonhuman elements,” in which the force of the confederation is more than the 
sum of its parts (although the parts are not actually constituted by one another).20  
Assemblages are not governed by any central head: no one materiality or type of 
material has sufficient competence to determine consistently the trajectory or 
impact of the group. The effects generated by an assemblage are, rather, emer-
gent properties, emergent in that their ability to make something happen […] is 
distinct from the sum of the vital force of each materiality considered alone.21 
These “effects” and the “ability to make something happen” make the assemblages 
affective. Bennett’s thinking has overt political implications ranging from consump-
tion to public health and energy policy,22 but it also applies to the present discussion 
of reading fiction. As Bennett suggests: 
Texts are bodies that can light up, by rendering human perception more acute, 
those bodies whose favored vehicle of affectivity is less wordy: plants, animals, 
blades of grass, household objects, trash. […] poetry can help us feel more of the 
liveliness hidden in such things and reveal more of the threads of connection 
binding our fate to theirs.23 
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We know that stories, as well as the “poetry” in the quotation, have the capacity to 
move us, but what is it actually that does the moving — especially in cases such as 
Barnes’s work, where we rarely get “round” human characters to identify with, or 
exciting lines of plot to follow?24 The following will suggest that the notion of the 
assemblage is key to understanding the affective appeal of Barnes’s tableaux vivants. 
Bennett’s deconstruction of the boundary between matter and life enables us to 
look at humans as well as nonhumans and things as simultaneously material and po-
tentially “vital.” To address the agential and affective potential in thingly players in a 
text, we thus need not limit our discussion of nonhuman agency in fiction to instances 
of anthropomorphism in the form of personification,25 or to the more complex phe-
nomenon of fetishism, which still has the human lacks, desires, and disavowals at its 
heart. This is extremely helpful, since many texts, such as the ones by Djuna Barnes 
analyzed here, display forms of nonhuman agency that extend beyond such devices 
and interpretations. Secondly, the notion of the affective body as a party in the emer-
gence of agency is a fruitful one for the reading of fictional texts, taking into account 
the embodied aspects of reading that also frame the discussion in this paper. 
3_Material Enactments of Experience 
As the main interest here is the agency of nonhuman affective bodies, it is important 
to discuss the reader, too, as a body, and to note the phenomenological elements of 
livedness that pertain to the human body. Our experience of fictional events, charac-
ters, and objects involves certain psychological processes, even though all of these 
need not be ‘human’ by definition. Embodied and enactive cognitive approaches to 
reading and fiction provide empirically-grounded conceptual aids to discussing read-
ing as an embodied event, and the reader as an embodied agent. 
Barad writes that agency is “an enactment, not something that someone or some-
thing has.”26 This is compatible with the view of experience and consciousness as 
properties enacted in the embodied organism’s interaction with the world, which is 
taken in enactivist phenomenology.27 When brought within the sphere of literature, 
this means a focus on the embodied experiences evoked by a narrative. As Marco 
Caracciolo puts it, citing the prevailing neurological views in relation to the imagi-
nary processes involved in reading: “If perception is embodied, then mental imagery 
must be embodied, too. [It is] deeply rooted in our real body and in memories of our 
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past sensorimotor interaction with the environment.”28 Our ways of imagining while 
reading resemble our active sensory exploration involved in experiencing reality.29 
Caracciolo sketches a process of “fictionalization of the reader’s virtual body” to 
tackle the embodied dimensions of fictional immersion, in which it is the reader’ 
body, not her consciousness, that can be transported virtually into the story.30 This 
transportation means an imaginary enactment of movements in the fictional world, 
based on the reader’s embodied experience of moving and living in the actual world.  
These formulations have mainly been used to discuss the enacted experiences of 
fictional characters or focalizing structures.31 However, it is plausible that the fiction-
alization of a virtual body would spill over the edges of characters in a human form, 
precisely thanks to the holistic conception of experience involved. As formulated by 
Alva Noë, because of the component of the virtual in our perception, we experience 
and make sense of the world and its objects by actively engaging with them — think-
ing with objects, so to speak.32 This kind of experience, then, becomes enacted also in 
reading fiction, as it is the only kind of experience we have access to. Therefore, in 
fiction, it is not only the human bodies that carry significance, but the constellations 
of human and environment, and the ways the humans act in the environment. Follow-
ing Bennett, this could be taken even further: the material being-in-the-world that is 
shared by human and nonhuman can enable projection of embodied experience be-
yond the form of the human body, to the animal or thingly.33 In the case of things, 
they are not only the object of our experience — we experience with things, and tak-
ing into account our own materiality, to some extent as things. 
Thus an enactivist conception of readerly experience also creates ways of bridging 
the human-thing gap when discussing the event of reading. It also serves to highlight 
the role of embodied experience and processes such as affective engagement in read-
ing, which ties in with the new materialist and posthumanist discussions of agency. 
The focus on embodiment and affectivity is also the reason why, in this essay, I re-
frain mostly from referring to ‘interpretation’ or ‘understanding’ of literature, and 
instead write about ‘making sense.’ This delicious polysemy reflects an epistemologi-
cal choice to foreground the processes of embodied, sensory imagining and grasping, 
which seem to be present in our dealings with literature, but which sometimes tend to 
be overlooked for the benefit of more conscious ‘interpretation’ and ‘understanding.’ 
For the type of sense-making that I wish to discuss in this essay, these terms carry too 
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strong a focus on cognitive appraisals of a “higher” order than affectivity, which, in 
recent enactivist accounts, is usually seen very broadly, as part of the mind and life of 
even simple organisms.34 
This is not to say that higher-order skills and interpretation would not play a part in 
reading Barnes, as they most definitely do. My suggestion, however, is that the en-
tangled human-nonhuman agencies we encounter in Barnes’s fiction are made sense 
of largely through less conscious or analytical, more primordial, affective, and even 
tactile forms of embodied sense-making, and that focusing on such sense-making 
might also increase our understanding of our being-in-the-world shared with and 
permeated by nonhuman elements. 
4_The Nonhuman in Characters 
Even though this essay focuses on discussing Barnes’s characters as thingly, their 
well-researched resemblance to animals is so closely linked to this discussion that it 
requires some attention here. The great number of animals in Barnes’s texts, and her 
characters’ animal-like traits have been discussed, for instance, by Alex Goody in the 
context of Deleuzean ‘becoming-animal’ and Bakhtinian grotesque.35 Carrie Rohman, 
on the other hand, notes how Robin Vote, the elusive, deceptive lover of Nightwood, 
“figures nonidentity as a form of subjectivity, where the nonlinguistic, the undecida-
ble, and the animal serve to revise what counts as human.”36  
Robin is the character who in Barnes’s work perhaps most strikingly combines 
psychological unfathomability with animal traits — as befits her avian name. As 
Rohman suggests, Robin is associated with silence and the absence of language, 
which contributes to her unreadability but does not exhaustively explain it. When she 
is first seen in the novel by her future husband Felix Volkbein and the eloquent pseu-
do-doctor Matthew O’Connor, she is lying on the bed in a hotel room, not only silent 
but unconscious. She is said to exude an odor with a “quality of that earth-flesh, fungi 
[…] texture of plant life.”37 Rohman points out, rightly so, that this foregrounding of 
the sense of smell locates Robin in the “realm of animality;”38 yet the passage has 
other elements from the realm of things, which have consequences for how readers 
are invited to imagine Robin. 
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The first things the intruders in the room are described seeing are a carpet and two 
windows. Then the focal point moves to the bed, but it takes its time before reaching 
Robin: 
On a bed, surrounded by a confusion of potted plants, exotic palms and cut 
flowers, faintly oversung by the notes of unseen birds, which seemed to have 
been forgotten — left without the usual silencing cover, which, like cloaks on 
funeral urns, are cast over their cages at night by good housewives — half flung 
off the support of the cushions from which, in a moment of threatened con-
sciousness she had turned her head, lay the young woman, heavy and disheveled. 
(N 30–31.) 
The narrating voice seems to get lost in detail of plants, fabrics, and birds in cages, 
producing a kind of tableau vivant of The Sleeping Beauty. The picture features the 
figure of a female human being, but the sheer amount of other nonhuman elements 
that override (and “oversing”) the human form.39  
Such patterns are typical of Barnes’s descriptions of characters. Consider, for 
comparison, the following excerpt from the short story A Boy Asks a Question (first 
version published 1923), of Carmen la Tosca. She is an actress come to spend her 
holiday in a village. A boy from a neighboring house interrupts her breakfast with a 
vague question about the nature of love, because he has heard her to be a woman of 
the world. The answer, too, remains vague, but Carmen delivers some lessons in life 
and some general encouragement; the following day, she leaves the village with her 
entourage, and there are no further mentions of the boy. Thus the story ends with the 
exit of another quite enigmatic and evasive character in Barnes’s repertoire. She is 
also another woman pictured in her bed: 
Carmen la Tosca breakfasted in bed, and late. Having caught herself out of sleep 
in a net of bobbin-lace, she broke fast with both food and scent, lazily dusting 
her neck and arms with perfumed talc, lolling on the bed (which stood between 
two ovals of pear-wood, framing versions of Leda and the swan), ripping 
through the wrappers of Puerto Rican journals and French gazettes with the 
blade of a murderous paper-cutter, and finally, in the total vacancy of complete 
indulgence, her hand sprawling across a screaming headline, would stare out into 
the harsh economy of russet boughs, pranked out in fruit.40 
This character, too, is surrounded by a multitude of fabrics, furniture, art, small ob-
jects, and plants. The borders of her agency are unclear: she has “caught herself out of 
sleep,” being simultaneously subject and object of waking up and hanging in the im-
aginary “net of bobbin-lace.” There are cues for the sense of smell in this description, 
and also sounds emerge to make the materiality of the words ring in the readers’ ears: 
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“ripping through the wrappers;” “screaming headline” — the latter pointing towards 
written language but also remaining mere noise, without conceptualizable content.  
In both of the quoted passages, the description of the surrounding space creates a 
sense of distance in relation to the character. The material detail certainly has poten-
tial for leaving a more vivid recollection than the human character engulfed by it. On 
the other hand, the character and the surroundings form an assemblage from which it 
might be useless to separate one or the other. The readers are given cues for embodied 
enactments through the focalizer, and the richness of materials produces an array of 
imaginable sensations, among which the human body is but one inanimate surface of 
an object that can be sensed virtually: a “heavy, disheveled,” and perfumed thing 
available to the senses, or a sprawling hand evoking tactile sensations. Considered in 
the Baradian framework, we could say that the characters emerge in the phenomenon 
of focalization. And borrowing from Bennett, none of the entities that emerge as 
thingly, in these assemblages of human, bird, plant, and furniture, is a carrier of agen-
cy in itself. It is the whole that has the potential to affect the reader. The descriptions 
of the human characters would not have the same effect, were they stripped from the 
material detail; the assemblage of detail, however, might have an almost equal effect, 
were the human element removed. In this case, the human element would still exist, 
though, in the reader’s enacted experience of the materialities described, based on the 
experiences of the reader’s body. 
Eventually, Robin wakes up. When she begins to act in the fictional world, readers 
are invited to engage in sense-making processes regarding these actions in some new 
ways, but Robin never sheds the sense of being a mixture of human, animal, and 
thing. She wanders into a marriage with Felix, gives birth to a child but remains al-
ienated from him, and subsequently drifts out of the marriage and into a passionate 
relationship with Nora Flood. She keeps drifting in the new relationship too, drinking 
and roaming from one café, one casual sexual relation to another, and finally out of 
reach for Nora. The reader is invited to side with Nora, as she tries but fails to under-
stand Robin, who remains “unable or unwilling to give an account of herself” (N 44). 
Nora explains her pain to Matthew O’Connor: “‘I’ll never understand her — I’ll al-
ways be miserable — just like this’;” “‘I can’t stand it, I don’t know — I am fright-
ened. […] What is it in her that is doing this?’” (N 76–77). This discussion, like 
many others in Barnes’s work, remains without closure, the interlocutors talking 
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slightly past one another. This heightens the sense of certain affective interchanges 
that exist beyond language. At the end of the novel, Robin is found in an abandoned, 
decaying chapel by Nora and her dog, and she performs an inexplicable, wordless 
gesture of falling down, crawling, and crying in front of the scared animal. This ges-
ture keeps repeating in Barnes’s fiction, often in a form that underlines it as a gesture, 
a literary motif, rather than the psychologically justifiable action of a human-like 
character. 
Both Carmen and Robin evade the touch of language, interpretation, and explana-
tion. It is entirely justifiable to read them as having symbolic or catalytic functions, as 
Abbott would suggest — thus Robin could be read as symbol of the animal, nonlin-
guistic, and unconscious sides in the human, or as a catalyst for other characters’ de-
sire and pain — or as a type, of perhaps a decadent modern 1920’s bisexual; whereas 
Carmen la Tosca, as her name suggests, would be a typified grande dame, a phallic 
woman, a symbol of feminine knowledge and power. Carmen, like Matthew, also acts 
as catalyst, a voice for the authorial agent to pronounce philosophical, although cryp-
tic, ideas with the authority of the woman of the world:  
Do you know what makes the difference between the wise man and the fool? 
Never do evil do good people, they always forgive, and that’s too much for any-
body. […] when it’s all over, you’ll listen to nothing at all; only the simple story, 
told by everything. (CS 349) 
Barnes’s writing definitely uses and even toys with such character functions. Yet 
these do not suffice to explain the potential for readerly engagement with what hap-
pens in her stories. Even Carmen’s “answer” to the boy’s question seems more like a 
gesture, playing with the archetype of the wise old man, inviting close interpretation 
but thwarting it by opaque references to “everything.”41 
The virtual embodiedness and materiality of the characters has a crucial role also 
in the way they come to act as symbols or catalysts, or how their reading as types 
contributes to making sense of the whole narrative. The portrayal of characters as 
thingly might be read as part of Barnes’s “dehumanizing” views and decadent sensi-
bilities, a sign of a pessimism as regards the human in general. However, in light of 
new materialist and enactivist thinking, it can equally be seen as an empowering ges-
ture, which shows the proximity of human and nonhuman as affective potential that 
emerges in different, singular assemblages. The action of the story unfolds in such 
fictional constellations, which make the characters affectively available for readers to 
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make sense of, constructing a basis for other types of interpretation, and permeating 
them, too. Robin and Carmen are characters we experience and enact virtually as feel-
ing bodies, regardless of how much we know of their psychological movements or 
otherwise construct them as human. The imaginary experientiality of the characters 
emerges together with readerly reactions to them as bodies, but also to the nonhuman 
bodies surrounding them. This brings us back to the question, are there any differ-
ences in how human and nonhuman bodies invite readers to react? How to conceive 
of agency and readerly experience in descriptions where there is no human body in-
cluded in the assemblages — or are such descriptions even possible? 
5_The Agency in Things 
If Barnes’s characters are verging on nonhuman, the thingly elements in her fiction 
are often particularly lively. The most vivid readerly recollections of Nightwood, for 
instance, might well be of its interior detail: Nora and Robin’s apartment with its fair-
ground horses and dolls, or Matthew’s room as described below by Nora: 
A pile of medical books, and volumes of a miscellaneous order, reached almost 
to the ceiling, water-stained and covered with dust. […] On a maple dresser, cer-
tainly not of European make, lay a rusty pair of forceps, a broken scalpel, half a 
dozen odd instruments that she could not place, a catheter, some twenty perfume 
bottles, almost empty, pomades, creams, rouges, powder boxes and puffs. From 
the half-open drawers of this chiffonnier hung laces, ribands, stockings, ladies’ 
underclothing and an abdominal brace, which gave the impression that the femi-
nine finery had suffered venery (N 70–71.) 
The description goes on so long that it is not possible here to provide a whole picture 
of the abundance of things in it. It forms a parallel with the introduction of Robin 
quoted earlier: after an array of scattered materialities, the focalizer’s gaze reaches 
Matthew, the human object (once again embedded in the immediate environment of a 
bed). 
We have seen how the human character emerges in a description of material 
things. But how do such descriptions affect us as readers, when the human has not 
(yet) emerged? Jane Bennett calls attention to an experience of being “struck” by ran-
dom debris she encounters on the street: 
In the second moment, stuff exhibited its thing-power: it issued a call, even if I 
did not quite understand what it was saying. At the very least, it provoked affects 
in me: I was repelled by the dead (or was it merely sleeping?) rat and dismayed 
by the litter, but I also felt something else: a nameless awareness of the impossi-
ble singularity of that rat, that configuration of pollen, that otherwise utterly ba-
nal, mass-produced plastic water bottle-cap.42 
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The encounter is beyond language and human fellow-feeling — yet Bennett argues 
that such experiences point at nonhuman, inanimate things having an agency of their 
own. The things do not move or show individual intentions. Still, the human capacity 
to be enchanted by things is proof of the things’ capacity to affect:  
[T]he figure of enchantment points in two directions: the first toward the humans 
who feel enchanted and whose agential capacities may be thereby strengthened, 
and the second toward the agency of the things that produce (helpful, harmful) 
effects in human and other bodies.43  
This needs to be seen as one more way to broaden the scope of agency outside the 
human sphere of intentionality and psychological motivation, toward the potential of 
affecting, which is not a unique human capacity. 
This exploration is actually quite compatible with the problem of nonhuman agen-
cy in literature. To begin with, fictional assemblages of objects, such as the ones de-
scribed in Nightwood, already set the stage for enchantment. Such passages offer sin-
gular, immanent objects to the reader’s primordially affective interest: that maple 
dresser, those perfume bottles, puffs and powders, that abdominal brace. Thus they 
enable the study of fictional encounters phenomenologically resembling the one expe-
rienced by Bennett. The earlier quotation from Bennett recalls Viktor Shklovsky’s 
statement: art “exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony.”44 These views 
capture the dialectic of “empathy and defamiliarization, the familiar and the strange,” 
which Bernaerts et al. refer to in discussing anthropomorphized nonhuman narrators, 
and which also pertains to the more murky cases of nonhuman agency encountered in 
Barnes.45 The open intentional state of reading, combined with the singularity of the 
fictional constellation, and the materialities of the language used, invites the reader to 
be affected, and engages her in a phenomenon of being-affected. 
In the description of Matthew’s room, even though everything described falls into 
the category of nonhuman (although they are also items made and used by humans), 
there is still a mode of humanness present in the form of focalization. Nora’s “fiction-
ally actual” body yields itself to us as a proxy, to align our “virtual body” with.46 We 
do not require a human focalizer for the projection of embodied experience, though: 
in instances of what Monika Fludernik has called “figuralization,” an “empty” deictic 
center is filled by readerly immersion which, as has been suggested here, arises from 
embodied experience.47 This is an intriguing notion from the perspective of engaging 
with the nonhuman as well as for its relevance to the modernist devices that Barnes 
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can be seen to use, and needs to be explored further with the help of one more short 
story. 
Finale, a short, two-page story (first published in 1918) is narrated extradiegetical-
ly from an empty deictic center, the focalization roaming around a room at the center 
of which lies a dead man in a coffin, surrounded by candles and mourners. In this 
story, the line between animate and inanimate, passive and active, does not fall neatly 
between human and nonhuman, as the narrating voice points out with regard to the 
corpse: “Everything else in the room seemed willing to go on changing — being. He 
alone remained cold and unwilling, like a stoppage in the atmosphere.” (CS 232). 
What keeps “changing” and “being” around him are his kneeling wife, mother and 
children, but also details of the material world, among them “the dead man’s dearest 
possession — a bright blue scarf embroidered with spots of gold.” (CS 233). The 
scarf could be called the leitmotif of the story. It was acquired during an apparent 
romantic encounter in Italy, and it has an experiential history: “It was a lovely thing, 
but much treasuring had lined it; and the marks of his thumbs as they passed over it in 
pleasant satisfaction had left their tarnish on the little spots of gold.” (CS 233) In the 
description of the scarf, a clear opening for the fictionalization of the reader’s virtual 
body comes in the reference to thumbs passing over it. 
After this description, shadows are described growing and darkness falling on the 
room and the mourners. The ending of the story is a layered structure of a narrative 
event and descriptive stagnation on top of one another, as it were: 
A large rat put his head out of a hole, long dusty, and peered into the room. 
 The children were going to rise and go to bed soon. The bodies of the mourners 
had that half-sorrowful, half-bored look of people who do something that hurts 
too long. 
 Presently the rat took hold of the scarf and trotted away with it into the dark-
ness of the beyond. 
 One thing only had the undertaker forgotten to do; he had failed to remove the 
cotton from the ears of the dead man, who had suffered from earache. (CS 233) 
The human element is still present, if not in the narrator, then in what is narrated. The 
characters become reified as bodies in a posture in-between actions, while the expres-
sive quality of the posture invites readers to resonate experientially with what it is like 
to “do something that hurts too long.” Traces of human agency and experience be-
come entangled with nonhuman elements: the rat is the most potent agent in the story, 
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whereas the scarf might be what is described in the liveliest manner. The rat’s “pre-
sent” actions follow their own pattern and do not cross with the other things going on 
in the room, except by removing the scarf from the scene. The last sentence is de-
scriptive, returning to the slow rhythm of changing/being and finally to the unchang-
ing/unbeing of the corpse. Yet the corpse is actually also changing, due to the non-
human agencies, namely the processes of decomposition at play in it — excepting, 
perhaps, only the cotton buds, a nonhuman element within it, profoundly entangled. 
There is no conscious human recognition of these crossings of human and nonhu-
man in the story. The scarf has been held dear and caressed, but is now forgotten; the 
once helpful, now out-of-place cotton is ignored. The bodies of the mourners seem 
almost as blind and deaf as the dead man, even though their postures evoke emotional 
and sensory experience. Yet there are encounters and entanglements that the story 
reveals, and it is these, I claim, that have the potential to strike and enchant the reader. 
The rat, unlike the one in Bennett’s description, is a very lively one, but also the scarf 
has some potency of its own, having attracted the dead man as well as the rat — and 
being described so vividly as to leave a mark on the reader as well. The cotton exhib-
its a resisting, negative power also associated with things.48 
In the fictional world of Finale, then, affective agency is distributed between hu-
man and nonhuman. Expressive suggestions of sense experience circle in the room. 
They are not reducible to human bodies, but arise between them and the nonhuman 
ones. Furthermore, were there no descriptions of or hints towards experience, I claim 
that a reader would be able to project something like it to the description of the scarf, 
for instance, like in the case of Matthew’s room. There we have Nora as a narrator-
focalizer, but the description does not differ markedly from one produced by an ex-
tradiegetic narrator, as regards the structure of readerly engagement. 
The position of the human as the only active player in encounters such as the one 
described by Bennett, as well as in Barnes’s tableaux vivants, becomes questioned, 
but this does not need to mean another grim view of the human possibilities of affect-
ing the world. Rather, it enables a more detailed analysis of agency in cases where the 
human body is more the one being affected than the one affecting, and thereby a bet-
ter understanding of the nonhuman forces that move us, and of how we also use our 
affective capacities to make sense of the world, and, in the case of fictional worlds, to 
make them. 
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I would argue that our readerly capacity of enacting experience reaches beyond 
structures of narration and ‘representations’ of human bodies and experience: we re-
spond to fictional things, because we have our own experience of sensing and other-
wise dealing with actual things, being in the world as three-dimensional bodies our-
selves, and because of our capacity for finding even nonhuman, inanimate things ex-
pressive and affectively appealing. Like in the case of human characters, being ex-
pressive does not require being ‘readable’, something we could attribute conscious-
ness and intention to; neither does it require being deciphered as a symbol or a type. 
These levels are present in Nightwood and “Finale” as well, but the fictional agencies 
and affective potential do not rest on them. Rather, most of what defines our reading 
happens on an embodied level that does not require, although participates in, symbol-
ic interpretation. Matthew’s stuff and the nonhuman movements in the funeral home 
strike and enchant us, first and foremost, in the material, embodied being we share 
with them.  
6_Conclusion 
With the discussions above, I have shown the profound entanglements of human and 
nonhuman fictional agencies in Barnes’s fiction, and demonstrated how they can ex-
emplify such fictional entanglements also more broadly. We have encountered a 
number of things or bodies as part of affective assemblages that are formed in the 
stories, and new ones formed in the context of this essay: fruit, birds, Robin Vote, 
bobbin-lace, Carmen la Tosca, a murderous paper-cutter, a catheter, a plastic bottle 
cap, Matthew O’Connor, two rats, and so on. I do not wish to lay these agents com-
pletely on the same plane in the manner of a “Latour litany.”49 We have different re-
sponses for Robin and a catheter — although we also have different responses for 
laces, a paper-cutter, and rats.  
I hope to have given at least two reasons for questioning the boundary between 
human and nonhuman in reading fiction. Firstly, the dichotomy is not a question of 
either-or but of both-and: in our experience of fiction, as in our everyday experience, 
we cannot conceive of one without the other, and the experience itself is dependent 
on nonhuman elements of the world. Secondly, from the point of view of embodied 
reading, a lot is shared between human and nonhuman agents, which is revealed by 
our capacity to make sense of and be affected by material expressivity, common to all 
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these things, which often is combined with their use as literary gestures, although 
remains a distinct phenomenon. As Bennett puts it: “One moral of the story is that we 
are also nonhuman and that things, too, are vital players in the world.”50 We need not 
go through the processes of attributing or enacting consciousness or to naturalize 
characters or narrators to project our experience into a narrative. All we need are bod-
ies and our own experience — and some language. More broadly considered, this also 
has ethical and political implications, such as a wider scope for empathy. Both within 
and outside the phenomenon of reading, we have the capacity to engage affectively 
with a number of different things. 
In new materialist terms, the experience of fiction emerges in the affective assem-
blage of fictional elements, be it human or nonhuman, in their materiality, grasped in 
the materialities of language by a material reader in a lived body. This reminds us, 
writing and reading as humans, of the close and affective relationships we have with 
things  ¸and the affective potential we share with them. Being entangled in a material 
world and thus, perhaps, “dehumanized,” need not mean only a pessimistic or fatal-
istic account of the loss of human agency: it merely shows the makings of this agency 
to be shared with the nonhuman world, with which we intra-act. Such interdepend-
ency (or intradependency?) may seem threatening, but it has enormous potential to be 
empowering by being inclusive of a wider array of agencies, and thereby avoiding 
some of the problems of exclusion inherent in the dichotomy of human/nonhuman. 
_Endnotes 
 
1  By ‘thing’ I refer to a material entity that is assumed to be inanimate. I use the term ‘thing’ in-
stead of ‘object’ to avoid the inherent division into active subject and passive object. Cf. for in-
stance Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” in Thing Theory, ed. Bill Brown (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2004), 1–24. 
2  Daniela Caselli, Repulsive Modernism: Djuna Barnes’s Bewildering Corpus (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009), 87. 
3  Cf. Cheryl J. Plumb, Fancy’s Craft: Art and Identity in the Early Works of Djuna Barnes 
(Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1986), 13. 
4  José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture, and Litera-
ture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968 [1925]). 
5  Cf. Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 
6  H. Porter Abbott, “Unreadable Minds and the Captive Reader,” in Style 4 (2008), 450–452. 
7  Julie Taylor, Djuna Barnes and Affective Modernism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2012) 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12351/ 
21 
 
8  Of course such devices are by no means unique to Barnes — we need only to think of the sublime 
landscapes in Gothic novels or Dickensian interiors that skillfully mirror characters — or go as far 
back as Aristotle to find a focus on action (the movement of bodies) rather than character: “you 
could not have a tragedy without action, but you can have one without character-study” (see Aris-
totle, Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Vol. 23, The Poetics, trans. W. H. Fyfe (London: Heinemann, 
1932). Yet Barnes’s texts provide us with a unique mixture of “lively” things paired with charac-
ters verging on thingly. 
9  Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 33; emphasis in the original. 
10  Barad, Meeting the Universe (cf. note 9), 32. 
11  Laura Oulanne, “Writing Wounded: Reading Djuna Barnes’s Writership as Affective Agency,” in 
Writing Emotions: Literature as Practice, eds. Ingeborg Jandl et al. (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2017); 
forthcoming. 
12  Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); see also Carl Knappett and Lambros Malafouris, eds., Material 
Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach (New York: Springer, 2008). 
13  Cf. Chris Calvert-Minor, “Epistemological Misgivings of Karen Barad’s ‘posthumanism’”  in 
Human Studies 1 (2014), 123–137. 
14  Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter,” in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28.3 (2003), 801–831. 
15  Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity” (cf. note 14), 801–831. 
16  Cf. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010), 2, 21–23. For more discussion of the Spinozist-Deleuzean account of affect, see for in-
stance Brian Massumi, “Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements,” in A Thousand Plat-
eaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, eds. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, trans. Brian Massumi 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), xv–xviii. 
17  Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press), 12; Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of 
Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory Reader, eds. Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (Durham: 
Duke University Press), 1–25. 
18  I will also use the word ‘feeling’, as I have done here, as a parallel concept to affect, however 
more colloquial, with less theoretical implications, but with capacity to evoke the embodied, sen-
sory dimensions of the phenomena. 
19  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), viii. 
20  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 23, 21. 
21  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 24. 
22  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), viii. 
23  Jane Bennett, “Systems and Things: On Vital Materialism and Object-Oriented Philosophy,” in 
The Nonhuman Turn, ed. Richard Grusin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 
223–239, here: 235. 
24  An exception is formed by Barnes’s early short stories, which feature parody forms of dramatic 
twists, surprises and slapstick comedy, while the characters resemble the “types” encountered in 
the later fiction. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12351/ 
22 
 
25  Bennett, though, suggests that there is no harm in “a bit of anthropomorphizing,” as it might actu-
ally work against anthropocentrism and provoke a grasping of different ways of nonhuman being: 
“a chord is struck between person and thing, and I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman en-
vironment” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 120). For research on anthropomorphized non-
human narrators, cf. Lars Bernaerts, Marco Caracciolo, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck, “The 
Storied Lives of Non-Human Narrators,” in Narrative 1 (2014), 68–93. 
26  Barad, Meeting the Universe (cf. note 9), 178. 
27  Cf. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). Cf. also Karin Kukkonen 
and Marco Caracciolo, “Introduction: What is the ‘Second Generation’?,” in Style 3 (2014), 261–
274. 
28  Marco Caracciolo, The Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2014), 160. 
29  Marco Caracciolo, “Interpretation for the Bodies: Bridging the Gap,” in Style 3 (2014), 385–403, 
here 389; Alva Noë: Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004). 
30  Caracciolo, Experientiality (cf. note 28), 159–160. 
31  Cf. Caracciolo, Experientiality (cf. note 28), 163. 
32  See for instance Noë, Action (cf. note 29), 72–73. Noë’s conception of the virtual component in 
perception is influenced by the “extended mind hypothesis” put forth by Clark and Chalmers, cf. 
Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” in Analysis 1 (1998), 7–19. 
33  There is a crucial difference here, of course, as the animal body is also lived, and we have some 
capacities to grasp “what it’s like to be a bat,” contrary to Thomas Nagel’s famous formulation 
(Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” in The Philosophical Review 83.4 (1974), 435–
450; cf. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1991); Ian Bo-
gost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 2012). 
34  Cf. Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind (Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013). 
35  Alex Goody, Modernist Articulations: A Cultural Study of Djuna Barnes, Mina Loy and Gertrude 
Stein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
36  Carrie Rohman, “Revising the Human: Silence, Being, and the Question of the Animal in 
Nightwood,” in American Literature 1 (2007), 57–84. 
37  Djuna Barnes, Nightwood = N (London: Faber and Faber, 2007 [1936]), 31. 
38  Rohman, “Revising the Human” (cf. note 36), 66. 
39  Later in the text, the view is actually compared to a jungle painting by Henri Rousseau. See 
Barnes, Nightwood (cf. note 37), 31. 
40  Djuna Barnes, Collected Stories = CS (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1997), 346–347. 
41  Cf. Oulanne, “Writing Wounded” (cf. note 11). 
42  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 4. 
43  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), xii. 
44  Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, eds. Julie Rivkin and 
Michael Ryan (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2004 [1917]), 15–21.  
45  Bernaerts et al., “The Storied Lives” (cf. note 25), 75. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12351/ 
23 
 
46  Caracciolo, Experientiality (cf. note 28), 160.  
47  Monika Fludernik, Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (New York: Routledge, 1996), 192–207. 
See also Caracciolo, Experientiality (cf. note 28), 168–172. 
48  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 1. 
49  A playful term used for a habitual way of listing different agencies or “actants” participating in an 
event, a phenomenon or a network that attempts to avoid classifications, hierarchies, and anthro-
pocentrism, used in the context of “Object Oriented Ontology”; Bogost, Alien Phenomenology 
(cf. note 33). 
50  Bennett, Vibrant Matter (cf. note 16), 4. 
